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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1]  In October 2006, Andrew Fire and Craig Mello won the Nobel Prize 
in Physiology or Medicine for discovering a process known as RNA 
interference in the soil nematode  Caenorhaditis elegans.1  More 
commonly known as RNAi, this process has great therapeutic significance 
for humans because of its ability to specifically and efficiently regulate 
gene expression.2  The capacity to easily regulate gene expression will 
tremendously impact our ability to combat a wide variety of disorders 
                                                 
∗ Gregory C. Ellis was awarded first place in the Fourth Biennial JOLT Writing 
Competition on the basis of this article.  Mr. Ellis is an associate at Townsend and 
Townsend and Crew, LLP, in San Francisco, California.  Mr. Ellis received his J.D. from 
the University of Washington School of Law in 2008.  He earned a Ph.D. from the 
University of Oregon in Molecular Biology in 2002 and a B.S. in Physiology from 
Michigan State University in 1995.   
∗∗ The author would like to thank Sean O'Connor, Christopher Holman, Scott Tobias, 
Stephanie Do, and Ya-Ling Wu for their helpful discussions on the topic. 
1 Nobelprize.org, The Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 2006, 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/2006 (last visited Sept. 15, 2008). 
2 See generally Andrew Fire et al., Potent and Specific Genetic Interference by Double-
Stranded RNA in Caenorhabditis Elegans, 391 NATURE 806 (1998) (describing discovery 
of RNAi). 
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ranging from cancer to infectious diseases.3  While the mechanism of 
RNAi was first published within the last decade,4 three RNAi-based 
human therapies are already in clinical trails.5 
 
[2]  In January 2008, just over one year after Fire and Mello’s discovery, 
scientists at the J. Craig Venter Institute published a report describing the 
first synthetically created bacterial genome.6  Synthetic biology, as the 
technology is known, has the potential to create microorganisms capable 
of producing inexpensive medical therapies, such as malarial vaccines, or 
even environmentally friendly industrial materials.7  In addition to other 
applications, research is currently underway to produce synthetic 
organisms for use as highly efficient biofuels that would reduce the 
environmental cost of producing such fuels.8 
 
[3]  RNAi and synthetic biology are seemingly diverse technologies; 
however, these two technologies share a common necessity—gene patents.  
Gene patents are essential to ensure that any useful application will result 
from either of these technologies.  Yet these emerging biotechnologies are 
not the only applications requiring gene patents.  Society has already 
benefited enormously from gene patents.  Biopharmaceutical drugs 
(“biologics”) currently make up 40% of all preclinical candidates and 25% 
                                                 
3 See Charles X. Li et al., Delivery of RNA Interference, 5 CELL CYCLE 2103, 2103 
(2006) (describing the versatility of RNAi). 
4 Antonin de Fougerolles et al., Interfering with Disease: A Progress Report on siRNA-
Based Therapeutics, 6 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 443 nn.1-2 (2007).   
5 See id. at 451.  
6 Daniel G. Gibson et al., Complete Chemical Synthesis, Assembly, and Cloning of a 
Mycoplasma Genitalium Genome, 319 SCI. 1215, 1200 (2008), available at 
http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/rapidpdf/1151721v1.pdf (describing the creation of 
synthetic genome). 
7 See Sapna Kumar & Arti Rai, Synthetic Biology: The Intellectual Property Puzzle, 85 
TEX. L. REV. 1745, 1746 (2007) (describing potential advantages of synthetic organisms 
along with the unique intellectual property issues that would arise from their 
advancement into mainstream biotechnology). 
8 See also Lee R. Lynd et al., How Biotech Can Transform Biofuels, 26 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 169, 170 (2008) (discussing the benefits of biotechnology with respect 
to increasing the “land fuel yield” for crops useful as biofuels).  See generally Biodiesel 
Times, Genome Transplant Biofuels and Synthetic Genomics, http://biodiesel.rain-
barrel.net/genome-transplant-biofuels-and-synthetic-genomics (last visited Sept. 15, 
2008).   
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of all new drug submissions for U.S. market approval.9  Furthermore, the 
biologics market is expanding at a rate far greater than the conventional 
drug market.10  Research and development for both biologic and 
conventional drug therapies is quite costly, as a single drug can cost up to 
$1.7 billion to bring it to market.11  As a result, the limited period of 
exclusivity afforded to patents is absolutely indispensable in providing the 
necessary incentive to invest so heavily in the research and development 
of most biologic drug therapies.12 
 
[4]  The promise of most biotechnologies could come to a screeching halt 
with the adoption of proposed bipartisan legislation that would effectively 
ban all gene patents.  Introduced by Congressmen Xavier Becerra and 
Dave Weldon, the Genomic Research and Accessibility Act (“GRAA”) 
simply states that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, no patent 
may be obtained for a nucleotide sequence, or its functions or correlations, 
or the naturally occurring products it specifies.”13  Senator Becerra asserts 
that “[g]ene patents interfere with research on diagnoses and cures.”14  
Gene patents have also caught the imaginative eye of the public.  In an op-
ed for the New York Times, Michael Crichton asserts that “[g]ene patents 
slow the pace of medical advance on deadly diseases,” and that “[y]ou, or 
someone you love, may die because of a gene patent that should never 
have been granted in the first place.”15  Some bioethicists have taken a 
more academic approach by offering legal commentaries that explore the 
                                                 
9 See Stacy Lawrence, Pipelines Turn to Biotech, 25 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1342, 
1342 (2007). 
10 See Saurabh Aggarwal, What’s Fueling the Biotech Engine?, 25 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 1097, 1097 (2007). 
11 Liora Sukhatme, Deterring Fraud: Mandatory Disclosure and the FDA Drug Approval 
Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1218 (2007). 
12 See also Christopher J. Betti, Diagnostic Genetic Technologies Left Stranded on First 
Base: A Need to Unwind the Protection Afforded Gene Patents, DUPAGE COUNTY BAR 
ASS’N BRIEF, April 2005, 22, at 23; cf. Marcia Angell, Excess in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry, 171 JAMC 1451, 1452 (2007). 
13 Genomic Research and Accessibility Act, H.R. 977, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (1st Sess. 
2007) [hereinafter GRAA]. 
14 See 153 CONG. REC. E315 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2007) (statement of Rep. Becerra), 2007 
WL 433061.  
15 Michael Crichton, Op-Ed., Patenting Life, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2007, at A23. 
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legitimacy and subsequent effects of the issuance of gene patents.16  
Prominent scientists have even jumped on the bandwagon.17  Although the 
language scientists use does not intentionally evoke the societal fear and 
paranoia that Crichton employs, both send the same message: gene patents 
are bad and should not be permitted.18   
 
[5]  Despite the public outcry, critics ostensibly fail to apprehend gene 
patents’ primary purpose and benefits.  In line with this reasoning, there is 
no convincing empirical evidence that gene patents are slowing the 
progress of biomedical or commercial research.19  With respect to 
diagnostic testing, a great deal of debate has focused on whether gene 
patents unnecessarily increase the costs of such diagnostic tests.20  Yet, 
many opponents of gene patents do not realize that patents that claim 
methods for diagnosing human genetic disorders comprise only a fraction 
of the total uses potentially employed by gene patents.21 
 
[6]  It would be extremely unfortunate if all the beneficial applications of 
gene patents were compromised at the expense of an overly broad and 
poorly drafted legislative bill that attempts to address a problem that is 
overblown and presumptuous.  Even if banning gene patents would 
provide greater access to genetic diagnostic tests, which is itself a 
questionable notion, what would be the use of knowing that you might 
acquire a genetic condition if potential drug therapies to treat such 
conditions were never realized as a result of that ban?   
 
[7]  If passed, the GRAA would be devastating to the progress of both 
health care and possibly even the protection of the environment.  A better 
solution would be to pass infringement exemption legislation that only 
                                                 
16 See generally Lori B. Andrews & Jordan Paradise, Gene Patents: The Need for 
Bioethics Scrutiny and Legal Change, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 403 (2005) 
(arguing that gene patents raise bioethical concerns and thus require policy reform). 
17 See, e.g., Who Owns Your Body, Nobel Laureate Opposes Gene Patents, 
http://www.whoownsyourbody.org/sulston.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2008).  
18 See, e.g., Andrews & Paradise, supra note 16, at 404 (“[P]atents for human genetic 
material are an example of a bad policy that needs to be corrected.”). 
19 See infra Parts III.A-B. 
20 See infra Part III.C. 
21 See infra Parts III.C, IV.B for a discussion pertaining to which types of inventions are 
most commonly associated with gene patents. 
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targets companies attempting to monopolize diagnostic testing for specific 
genetic mutations, but without interfering with the commercial needs of 
companies that plan to develop genome-wide genetic analyses utilizing 
microchip array technologies.22  This solution is especially advantageous 
in light of the technological paradigm shift currently underway from single 
gene diagnostic testing to genome-wide genetic analyses.23  Such 
legislation would avoid interfering with the innovative incentive provided 
to biologic drug manufacturers as a result of gene patent protection, and 
would more appropriately address the issues associated with genetic 
diagnostic tests. 
 
[8]  The purpose of this article is to examine current United States patent 
law and policy with respect to gene patents, and to argue that the benefits 
of gene patents far outweigh any disadvantages.  Aside from so-called 
moral opposition against gene patents, which rarely amounts to any 
meaningful proposals of reform,24 more commonsensical arguments 
against gene patents can be divided into two broad categories.  First, 
opponents of gene patents assert that genetic material simply is not 
patentable subject matter under current U.S. patent law.  Second, even if 
genes are patentable subject matter, critics assert that policy concerns 
dictate that genetic material should not be patented because of the adverse 
effects such patents may have.  Part II of this article discusses the 
patentability of genetic material under current U.S. patent law.  Part III 
examines the policies that maintain that gene patents hinder research or 
prevent reasonable access to genetic diagnostic tests.  Part IV 
demonstrates how gene patents have already benefited society by 
encouraging the development of biologic drug therapies.  Finally, Part V 
reveals that emerging biotechnologies, including yet-to-be-discovered 
biotechnologies, will fail to materialize without the acceptance of gene 
patents. 
 
                                                 
22 See infra Part III.C for a discussion pertaining to legislation that more appropriately 
targets issues relating to genetic testing. 
23 Arun Kalyanasundaram et al., Genomics, Haplotypes and Cardiovascular Disease, 
FUTURE CARDIOLOGY, Dec. 17, 2007, available at 
http://www.futuremedicine.com/doi/pdf/10.2217/14796678.3.6.601. 
24 See Timothy Caulfield et al., Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of Human Gene 
Patenting Controversies, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1091, 1091 (2006). 
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II.  GENETIC COMPOSITIONS ARE PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER UNDER 
CURRENT U.S. PATENT LAW  
 
[9]  Before addressing the more pertinent debate as to whether policy 
considerations should require legislative action that would preclude gene 
patents, the standards associated with the patentability of genetic 
compositions under current U.S. law warrant discussion.  This part will 
provide a brief synopsis of the two most controversial patentability 
requirements for gene patents: novelty and utility. 
 
A.  WHAT IS A GENE PATENT? 
 
[10]  As advances in molecular biology have provided greater insight into 
the complexities of the cellular processes facilitated by macromolecules 
such as deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”), it has become increasingly 
challenging to accurately define a gene.25  A generally acceptable 
scientific definition of a gene is “[a] locatable region of genomic 
sequence, corresponding to a unit of inheritance, which is associated with 
regulatory regions, transcribed regions and/or other functional sequence 
regions.”26  
 
[11]  The phrase “gene patent” does not have any legal basis, but is rather 
a term used mostly by commentators who address the legitimacy of such 
patents.  The United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) 
asserts that a patent may contain claims directed towards an isolated and 
subsequently purified genetic composition.27  As far as the USPTO is 
concerned, however, a genetic composition is broader than the scientific 
definition of a gene.  Nucleic acids are the building blocks of both DNA 
and ribonucleic acid (“RNA”),28 and a polynucleotide is basically any 
DNA or RNA sequence.29  In practice, patents have been issued for 
                                                 
25 See Helen Pearson, What is a Gene?, 441 NATURE 399, 399 (2006) (noting that 
defining what a gene is has become more difficult as scientists further the knowledge of 
molecular genetics). 
26 Id. at 401. 
27 Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001). 
28 See MedicineNet.com, http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=4594 
(last visited Sept. 15, 2008), for a basic definition of nucleic acid. 
29 See Answers.com, http://www.answers.com/topic/polynucleotide?cat=health (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2008), for a basic definition of polynucleotide 
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polynucleotides that correspond to “a full-length protein encoding gene, a 
gene fragment, a regulatory region, a cDNA molecule, or a genomic 
region of unknown function.”30  Furthermore, patented polynucleotides 
may be either isolated or recombinant.31  Accordingly, this article will 
generically refer to a gene patent as a patent that contains claims directed 
toward a genetic composition that encompasses any polynucleotide 
sequence, or toward methods that utilize such a composition.32  This 
distinction is important considering that the GRAA’s definition of what 
should be prevented from patenting includes any nucleotide sequence.33   
 
B. ISOLATED AND PURIFIED GENETIC COMPOSITIONS ARE NOT 
NATURALLY OCCURRING 
 
[12]  Gene patent critics have asserted that genes are products of nature, 
and therefore do not deserve patent protection;34 however, the debate as to 
whether products of nature should be patented existed well before the 
emergence of gene patents.  
 
[13]  The landmark case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty35 was the first 
Supreme Court decision to address whether bioengineered organisms 
could be patented.  In 1972, Ananda Chakrabarty filed a patent application 
containing claims directed towards a genetically engineered bacterium 
capable of breaking down crude oil.36  Such bacteria do not exist in nature, 
and were thought to have significant use for treating oil spills.37  The 
                                                 
30 See Christopher M. Holman, The Impact of Human Gene Patents on Innovation and 
Access: A Survey of Human Gene Patent Litigation, 76 UMKC L. REV. 295, 312 
(providing examples of issued patents that claim a variety of different forms of genetic 
compositions); see infra Parts II.B-C (discussing the patentability of genetic 
compositions). 
31 Holman, supra note 30, at 311. 
32 See id. at 312, for a comprehensive description of gene patents.   
33 GRRA, H.R. 977, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (1st Sess. 2007). 
34 Andrews & Paradise, supra note 16, at 405; Oskar Liivak, The Forgotten Originality 
Requirement: A Constitutional Hurdle for Gene Patents, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 261, 263 (2005); Stephanie Arcuri, Note, They Call That Natural? An Analysis of 
the Term “Naturally Occurring” and the Application of Genes to the Patent Act, 40 VAL. 
U. L. REV. 743, 746 (2006); Crichton, supra note 15, at A23. 
35 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
36 Id. at 305-06. 
37 Id. at 305. 
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patent examiner rejected the claims, asserting that microorganisms are 
“products of nature,” and that living things are not patentable subject 
matter.38  The decision of the Court, which arguably provided a legal 
foundation from which the biotechnology industry has advanced,39 held 
that Chakrabarty’s live, human-made microorganism was the “result of 
human ingenuity and research,”40 and thus should be considered 
patentable subject matter.41  In determining that genetically modified 
bacteria are patentable, the Court provided its now infamous declaration 
that “Congress intended statutory subject matter to ‘include anything 
under the sun that is made by man.’”42 
 
[14]  Isolated and purified compositions are not excluded from 
patentability either.  In 1970, hormones isolated and purified from human 
prostate glands were held to exist in a state not found in nature, and were 
therefore found to be patentable because the isolated and purified 
hormones were not considered “naturally occurring.”43  In fact, isolated 
and purified compositions have been considered novel for almost a 
century—extracted adrenaline was held to be patentable in 1912.44  In 
determining that extracted adrenaline was patentable, Judge Learned Hand 
asserted that “an extracted product without change,” even lacking 
subsequent purification, is worthy of patent protection.45  The USPTO 
applies this rationale to gene patents, maintaining that a genetic 
composition is not automatically precluded from patent protection as long 
as the composition is “isolated from its natural state and processed through 
purifying steps that separate the gene from other molecules naturally 
associated with it.”46  
                                                 
38 Id. at 306. 
39 See Terri A. Jones, Note, Patenting Transgenic Animals: When the Cat’s Away, the 
Mice Will Play, 17 VT. L. REV. 875, 883-84 (1993) (noting that the Chakrabarty decision 
accelerated commercial biotechnology innovation). 
40 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313.  
41 Id. at 309-10. 
42 Id. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2394, 2399).  
43 In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 1401 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
44 Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford & Co., 196 F. 496, 499 (2d Cir. 1912), aff’g 189 
F. 95 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911).  
45 Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d, 
196 F. 496 (1912). 
46 Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1093. 
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[15]  Despite almost a hundred years of legislative history and judicial 
precedent, some commentators still insist that claiming a purified and 
isolated gene is not novel, but is a “trick of claim drafting” that 
circumvents a proper interpretation of U.S. patent law.47  More 
specifically, these arguments posit that an isolated and purified gene 
sequence is simply a copy of the naturally occurring sequence, and thus 
lacks originality.48  Still, it must be remembered that gene patents are not 
permitted simply for “sequence data that represent genes as they naturally 
occur within human chromosomes.”49  Rather, a genetic composition is 
only patentable if it is useful as a “pharmaceutical drug, screening assay, 
or other application.”50   
 
C.  STRICT UTILITY REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET IN ORDER TO OBTAIN 
PATENT PROTECTION FOR GENETIC COMPOSITIONS 
 
[16]  Even if isolated and purified genetic compositions are eligible to 
meet the novelty standard of U.S. patent law, such compositions must also 
have utility (i.e., be useful) in order to procure patent protection. 
Questions as to whether the current utility standard was sufficient, in light 
of the technology associated with genomic sequencing, arose in the course 
of two notable events in the 1990s. 
 
[17]  In 1992, Dr. Craig Venter51 applied for three gene patents for 6,800 
expressed sequence tags (“ESTs”).52  ESTs are short segments of DNA 
that represent portions of expressed genes, and may be useful for example, 
                                                 
47 Liivak, supra note 34, at 263-64. 
48 Id. at 264. 
49 James Bradshaw, Gene Patent Policy: Does Issuing Gene Patents Accord with the 
Purposes of the U.S. Patent System? 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 637, 648 (2001) 
(discussing further requirements beyond mere copying of a gene’s sequence that provides 
for some genetic compositions to be patentable as a result of no longer being naturally 
occurring).  
50 Id. at 648-49.   
51 Craig Venter was the founder of commercially-based Celera Genomics that competed 
with the federally funded Human Genome Project to complete the sequencing of the 
human genome.  Jonathan Kahn, What’s the Use? Law and Authority in Patenting 
Human Genetic Material, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 417, 420 (2003). 
52 See id. at 420. 
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to map which sequences in a genome are protein coding genes.53  
Although these applications were ultimately withdrawn, Venter 
subsequently applied for patents that covered over 20,000 genetic 
compositions as CEO of Celera Genomics.54  In doing so, Venter asserted 
that the patents would be used to later diagnose genetic disorders.55  The 
USPTO denied his applications with the implication that simply finding a 
gene sequence without an established utility does not merit patent 
protection.56 
 
[18]  The increased desire for more stringent utility requirements was the 
result of incidences of opportunistic protection of subsequently discovered 
uses for some gene patents.  For example, in 1995, Human Genome 
Sciences (“HGS”) filed an application for a gene known as HDGNR10.57  
HGS made rather generic claims regarding the utility of its gene: it is 
useful for “identifying [receptor] antagonists and agonists.”58  What HGS 
did not know at the time, but was discovered the following year by 
scientists at the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”), was that the protein 
encoded by the gene, named CCR5 by the NIH scientists, was identified as 
a receptor essential for HIV infection.59  Although HGS was unaware of 
the true utility of its gene at the time of filing, HGS now enjoys the 
exclusive right to license the patent to another biotechnology company 
that is using the CCR5 protein product in an effort to develop an HIV 
vaccine.60   
 
                                                 
53 National Center for Biotechnology Information, Just the Facts: A Basic Introduction to 
the Science Underlying NCBI Resources, 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/About/primer/est.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2008). 
54 See Kahn, supra note 51. 
55 See iBrief, The Fate of Gene Patents Under the New Utility Guidelines, DUKE L. & 
TECH. REV., Feb 28, 2001, ¶ 5 (2001). 
56 Id. 
57 See Mattias Luukkonen, Gene Patents: How Useful Are the New Utility 
Requirements?, 23 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 337, 338 (2001). 
58 Sean C. Pippen, Dollars and Lives: Finding Balance in the Patent “Gene Utility” 
Doctrine, 12 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 193, 195 (2006) (quoting U.S. Patent No. 6,205,154 
abstract (filed June 6, 1995)). 
59 Id. at 195-96; see also Luukkonen, supra note 57, at 338 (stating that CCR5 is encoded 
as an “essential” co-receptor for HIV). 
60 See Luukkonen, supra note 57; see Pippen, supra note 588, at 196. 
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[19]  As a result of these events, and in response to criticism that gene 
patents were being granted too liberally,61 the USPTO issued new Utility 
Examination Guidelines (“Guidelines”) in January 2001.62  The 
Guidelines increased the utility standard for gene patents,63 and provided 
that an invention is useful only if it has a “well-established utility.”64  This 
requires the genetic composition’s utility to be “specific, substantial, and 
credible.”65 
 
[20]  The more stringent utility requirements promulgated by the 
Guidelines forced stricter examination of patents, allowing only the 
patenting of useful genetic compositions as required by patent policy.  
Thus, ESTs must now have a “real world” utility,66 and will not satisfy the 
well-established utility requirement put forth by the Guidelines if those 
ESTs are only useful, for example, as “probes, chromosome markers, or 
other research tools.”67  Additionally, the Guidelines will function to 
substantially limit opportunistic patenting that is similar to the approach of 
the HGS scientists. 
 
[21]  Although the Guidelines stopped short of clearly defining what 
requirements a genetic composition must meet to be useful,68 the 
Guidelines ultimately corroborated the USPTO’s intent to issue patents 
claiming genetic compositions under requisite circumstances.69  This 
corroboration is based on the USPTO’s conclusion that current patent law 
does not prohibit gene patents.70  It should be acknowledged, however, 
that the Guidelines are just that—guidelines that patent examiners should 
follow when determining whether an invention meets the utility 
requirement.   
 
                                                 
61 See Kahn, supra note 51, at 421. 
62 Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1092. 
63 See Melissa E. Horn, DNA Patenting and Access To Healthcare: Achieving the 
Balance Among Competing Interests, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 253, 257 (2003). 
64 Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1098. 
65 Id. 
66 iBrief, supra note 55, ¶ 28. 
67 Id. ¶ 20. 
68 See Pippen, supra note 58, at 205. 
69 Horn, supra note 63, at 257; iBrief, supra note 55, ¶ 2. 
70 Cf. Pippen, supra note 58, at 204. 
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[22]  The Guidelines are not law, and the USPTO clearly acknowledges 
this fact.71  Nonetheless, the Guidelines have been substantially 
indoctrinated into common law, most notably with the Federal Circuit’s 
2005 In re Fisher72 decision.  This decision pertained to a rejected patent 
application that claimed ESTs that correspond to certain maize genes.73  
The inventor was unaware of the precise structure or function of the genes 
encoded by the claimed ESTs when he filed the patent application.74  
Despite this lack of functional knowledge, the inventor argued that the 
uses of the ESTs were not related to the functions of the underlying genes, 
but could be used as a research tool comparable to a “microscope.”75  
While the court acknowledged that the Guidelines were not binding in its 
decision,76 the court essentially endorsed the Guidelines in determining 
that Fisher’s ESTs did not have any real world utility based on an asserted 
“specific and substantial” use.77  
 
[23]  With respect to current U.S. patent law regarding gene patents, as 
long as an inventor isolates and subsequently purifies a genetic 
composition, and can further show that the composition has a non-obvious 
real world use, the USPTO will issue a patent.78  Furthermore, the judicial 
branch has not interpreted current U.S. patent law as a prohibition against 
gene patents.79  Thus, this article will proceed with the presupposition that 
genetic compositions are patentable subject matter.  
 
III.  POLICY CONSIDERATIONS STIR THE GENE PATENT DEBATE 
 
[24]  As discussed above, genetic compositions are patentable subject 
matter under current U.S. patent law, and there does not appear to be any 
indication that such practices will cease without legislative action.  
                                                 
71 Id. at 193. 
72 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
73 Id. at 1368. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 1373. 
76 Id. at 1372.  
77 Id. at 1373; Recent Case, Patent Law—Utility—Federal Circuit Holds That Expressed 
Sequence Tags Lack Substantial and Specific Utility Unless Underlying Gene Function is 
Identified—In Re Fisher, 421 F.3D 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005), 119 HARV. L. REV. 2604, 2605 
(2006). 
78 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000). 
79 See Holman, supra note 30, at 296. 
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Accordingly, as opposed to questioning the legitimacy of gene patents 
under the standards of current U.S. patent law, the more relevant question 
is whether policy arguments that take into account the actual consequences 
of such patents require action limiting patent protection for genetic 
compositions.  
 
[25]  This article argues that not only should policy concerns prevent a ban 
on gene patents, but that policy considerations actually favor gene patents.  
Nonetheless, concerns of the possible negative effects of gene patents 
deserve recognition in order to demonstrate the unsubstantiated trepidation 
associated with such concerns.  Two common arguments exist regarding 
policy justifications that question gene patents.  The first argument asserts 
that gene patents impede basic or biomedical research and/or commercial 
innovation.  Not only will this section demonstrate that this argument is 
largely unsupported, but it will also show that such concerns are being 
unfairly waged against gene patents and are applicable to many types of 
patents.  The second argument in favor of a ban against gene patents 
asserts that such patents prevent reasonable access to diagnostic testing of 
genetic disorders.   
 
A.  GENE PATENTS DO NOT RESTRAIN BASIC OR BIOMEDICAL 
RESEARCH 
 
[26]  Whereas proponents of gene patents contend that such patents 
encourage innovation,80 some critics maintain that gene patents interfere 
with research and development, and are therefore contrary to patent 
policy.81  Such criticisms are largely based on anecdotal evidence gathered 
                                                 
80 Id.  See generally David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent Metrics: The 
Mismeasure of Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1677 (2007) 
(providing an empirical demonstration that gene patents are not hindering innovation). 
81 See 153 CONG. REC. E315 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2007) (statement of Rep. Becerra), 2007 
WL 433061; John F. Merz et al., Diagnostic Testing Fails the Test, 415 NATURE 577, 577 
(2002); Byron V. Olsen, The Biotechnology Balancing Act: Patents For Gene Fragments, 
and Licensing the “Useful Arts,” 7 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 295, 334 (1997); Jordan 
Paradise, European Opposition to Exclusive Control Over Predictive Breast Cancer 
Testing and the Inherent Implications for U.S. Patent Law and Public Policy: A Case 
Study of the Myriad Genetics’ BRCA Patent Controversy, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 133, 149 
(2004); Horn, supra note 63, at 282; Crichton, supra note 15, at A23.  See generally Lori 
B. Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma: Balancing Commercial Incentives with Health 
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from one third-party survey that sought to determine the full range of 
genetic data withheld by academic geneticists.82  The conclusion that gene 
patents interfere with basic research is based on observations that 21% of 
surveyed researchers withheld data in order to protect commercial 
interests in their research.83  Yet, as soon as a university researcher 
becomes interested in commercializing his or her research, that research is 
clearly no longer basic academic research.  The survey relied upon, 
however, is silent as to whether the researchers who were actually 
prevented from obtaining information or materials because of commercial 
interests were themselves basic researchers with no commercial 
ambitions.84  It is necessary to address this omission before concluding 
that such data signifies a hindrance on noncommercial biomedical 
research.  Furthermore, it is important to note that the survey was not even 
unique to gene patents, as it noted that “geneticists were no more likely 
than other life scientists to report that their requests were denied.”85  
 
[27]  The true test of whether gene patents are hindering noncommercial 
biomedical research is to examine whether biomedical researchers without 
commercial interests are prevented from acquiring materials, not whether 
researchers with commercial interests are withholding materials.  Recent 
surveys of biomedical researchers in universities, government, and 
nonprofit institutions questioned whether patents could be blamed for 
blocked access to biomedical research materials.86  These surveys found 
that while access to research materials at times may be restricted, “the 
patent status of the requested material had no significant effect” on why 
those materials were restricted.87  In fact, none of those surveyed declared 
that third-party patents stopped their research and only 1% stated that 
research was delayed as a result of another party’s patent.88  The survey 
                                                                                                                         
Needs, 2 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 65, 79-81 (2002) (arguing that the rationales that 
are appropriate for granting patents for some products do not apply to gene patents). 
82 See generally Eric G. Campbell et al., Data Withholding in Academic Genetics: 
Evidence from a National Survey, 287 JAMA 473 (2002) (surveying to what degree and 
for what reasons geneticists withhold sharing information and materials). 
83 Id. at 478 fig. 
84 Id. at 473. 
85 Id. at 474. 
86 See John P. Walsh et al., View from the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309 
SCI. 2002, 2002 (2005). 
87 Id. at 2003. 
88 Id. at 2002. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XV, Issue 1 
  
15 
authors concluded that their “results offer little empirical basis for claims 
that restricted access to IP is currently impeding biomedical research.”89  
Accordingly, there is a paucity of compelling evidence gathered from 
surveys of basic biomedical researchers that gene patents specifically 
interfere with strictly academic research.90 
 
[28]  If gene patents are not dissuading academic investigators who 
engage strictly in basic research from sharing or receiving data and 
materials, could researchers nonetheless be held liable if their research 
infringes upon another’s gene patent?  It is appropriate to note that patent 
law does not always prohibit use of a patented invention.  There is a 
common law exception from infringement, known as the experimental use 
exception, which provides relief from patent infringement if the conduct is 
“merely for philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining 
the sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects.”91  The 
experimental use exception has frequently been applied to academic 
researchers and institutions.92  
 
[29]  The two-century-old experimental use exception has become even 
narrower in recent years,93 leaving many academic researchers to question 
whether their activities might leave them liable for infringement.94  In 
2002, the Federal Circuit held in Madey v. Duke95 that the experimental 
use exception did not apply to a private research university96 despite the 
                                                 
89 Id. at 2003. 
90 See generally id., which demonstrates the failure of biomedical researcher surveys to 
provide conclusive proof that gene patenting significantly interferes with strictly 
academic non-commercial research.  
91 Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813). 
92 See Michael S. Mireles, Adoption of the Bayh-Dole Act in Developed Countries: Added 
Pressure For a Broad Research Exemption in the United States? 59 ME. L. REV. 259, 
277-78 (2007). 
93 See generally Elizabeth A. Rowe, The Experimental Use Exception to Patent 
Infringement: Do Universities Deserve Special Treatment?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 922-
23 (2006) (discussing the possible impact of Madey v. Duke Univ.). 
94 See generally Amy Yancey & C. Neal Stewart, Jr., Are University Researchers at Risk 
for Patent Infringement?, 25 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1225 (2007) (discussing the 
notion that the traditional practice of ignoring patents by university researchers with no 
commercial interests might nonetheless leave such researchers liable for infringement). 
95 Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
96 See Rowe, supra note 93, at 944-45. 
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fact that the university was not directly involved in any commercial 
ventures related to the patented invention.97  The reasoning behind this 
controversial decision was that noncommercial research still advances the 
university’s educational mission to “increase the status of the institution 
and lure lucrative research grants, students and faculty.”98  
 
[30]  Although it may be advantageous to retain a broad experimental use 
exception for public sector researchers,99 it is still unclear how the Madey 
decision will affect academic researcher’s ability to use the experimental 
use exception as a defense against infringement.100  Some have argued that 
a de facto experimental use exception nonetheless applies to pre-
commercialization researchers.101  The reasoning behind this notion is that 
patent holders are unlikely to even be aware of early stage infringing 
activities taking place among academics, and even if they were aware, 
“the damages would prove too small to justify the cost of litigation.”102 
 
[31]  Legislation that failed to pass would have protected noncommercial 
research against infringement of a gene patent.103  The Genomic Research 
and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002 (“GRDAA of 2002”)104 
provided two provisions that exempted individuals from infringement of 
gene patents.105  One provision that pertained to diagnostic tests is 
discussed below.106  The other provision would have provided an 
                                                 
97 Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362-63. 
98 Id. at 1362. 
99 See David C. Hoffman, Note, A Modest Proposal: Toward Improved Access to 
Biotechnology Research Tools by Implementing A Broad Experimental Use Exception, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 993, 1039 (2004) (arguing that an expansive experimental use 
exception applied only to public sector researchers would permit noncommercial use of 
reagents for when equivalent substitutes are unavailable).  
100 Yancey & Stewart, supra note 94, at 1227. 
101 See Rowe, supra note 93, at 950. 
102 Id. 
103 See Gregory P. Lekovic, Article: Genetic Diagnosis and Intellectual Property Rights: 
A Proposal to Amend "The Physician Immunity Statute", 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & 
ETHICS 275, 296-97 (2004) (discussing the legislative history of the Genomic Research 
and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002). 
104 Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002, H.R. 3967, 107th Cong. 
(2002). 
105 See also Betti, supra note 12, at 25-26 (discussing congressional action that would 
alleviate issues surrounding gene patents and diagnostic testing). 
106 See infra Part III.C. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XV, Issue 1 
  
17 
exemption from infringement for those that used patented genetic 
technologies for noncommercial research purposes;107 however, the 
legislation never passed.108  Nonetheless, as long as an academic 
researcher has no commercial intentions, it is extremely unlikely, though 
not impossible, that an academic researcher will find herself in court for 
infringing a gene patent.  At any rate, contentions that gene patents are 
compromising basic academic research are overstated and not even 
exclusively based on gene patents.109   
 
B.  GENE PATENTS ARE NOT COMPROMISING COMMERCIAL INNOVATION 
 
[32]  The next concern to address is whether gene patents interfere with 
innovation when commercialization factors into the equation.  Since the 
passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, academic researchers have been 
able to commercialize their research efforts despite funding from the 
government.110  The purpose of the Bayh-Dole Act was “to promote the 
utilization of inventions arising from federally supported research or 
development.”111  The fact that academic researchers can patent and 
subsequently license inventions has raised concerns that the public must 
pay twice for innovation: first through the taxes that funded the research, 
and then for the high prices enabled by the patent rights.112  Similar 
arguments have been raised in regard to gene patents, due to the fact that 
the Human Genome Project was publicly funded.113  These claims are only 
convincing if “the patent arising from the federal funding effectively 
covers the eventual product that will be brought to market.”114  As this 
article will demonstrate, most commercialized innovations arising from 
gene patents are biologic drug therapies that are so far removed 
                                                 
107 See Betti, supra note 12, at 25-26. 
108 Id. at 25. 
109 See Campbell, supra note 82, at 478; see supra text accompanying notes 89-90.   
110 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000); see In re Roche Molecular Sys., 516 F.3d 1003, 1008 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The Bayh-Dole Act is intended to promote 
investment by the private sector in commercialization of federally funded research 
discoveries for the public good.”). 
111 35 U.S.C. § 200. 
112 See Sean M. O’Connor, Intellectual Property Rights and Stem Cell Research: Who 
Owns the Medical Breakthroughs?, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 665, 685 (2005). 
113 Andrews & Paradise, supra note 16, at 406. 
114 O’Connor, supra note 112, at 685.  
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downstream from the gene discovery phase that public fears of having to 
pay twice are substantially unwarranted. 115 
 
[33]  The concerns that gene patents reduce commercial innovation are not 
exclusive to academic researchers that desire to commercialize their 
research.  Public sector researchers that must compete with the intellectual 
property rights of for-profit corporations, and even the established 
biotechnology companies themselves, share such concerns.  A growing 
concern among intellectual property commentators arises from what is 
known as the “tragedy of the anticommons.”116  An intellectual property 
anticommons is created by patent thickets117 that allow multiple patent 
owners to each have a right to exclude others from a scarce resource so 
that no one individual has an effective privilege of use.118  Accordingly, 
technologies requiring many patented components are usually more 
susceptible to anticommons effects.  Patent thickets generally raise 
concerns that resulting anticommons will block innovation because of “the 
cost of bringing downstream technologies to market.”119  It is argued that 
such costs are caused by each upstream patent holder setting up 
“tollbooths” of high bargaining costs and licensing fees, which 
subsequently slow the pace of downstream innovation.120   
 
[34]  One area that has prompted concerns regarding patent thickets is 
agricultural biotechnology.  To exemplify, Golden Rice is a genetically 
modified crop that has significantly elevated levels of vitamin A because 
                                                 
115 See infra note 162 and accompanying text. 
116 See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? 
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698 (1998) (describing how the 
“tragedy of the commons” metaphor helps to explain an “anticommons” in which 
resources are underused as a result of blocking patents). 
117 The phrase “patent thickets” is often used either interchangeably, or in conjunction 
with, the phrase “tragedy of the anticommons.”  See Kenneth Neil Cukier, Navigating the 
Future(s) of Biotech Intellectual Property, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 249, 250 (2006); 
Yancey & Stewart, supra note 94, at 1225-26. 
118 See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 116, at 698. 
119 Yancey & Stewart, supra note 94, at 1225-26. 
120 Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing The Double Helix: A Novel 
and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV 303, 
418 (2002); see Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 116, at 698-99. 
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of the transgenic expression of beta-carotene.121  There is a prediction that 
the impact of Golden Rice could save millions of lives annually in the 
developing world.122  The development of Golden Rice required an 
astonishingly large array of patent-protected technologies; it called for 
seventy patent-protected technologies belonging to over thirty public and 
private sector entities.123  Fortunately, these patent-holding entities 
cooperated by offering free licenses in order to promote distribution of the 
crop to the developing world.124  Still, it is uncertain at this time whether 
similar patent holders will be as cooperative in sharing other agricultural 
biotechnologies intended for food security in the developing world.125 
 
[35]  In regard to human gene patents, critics have warned that gene patent 
thickets will “increase the costs of genetic diagnostics, slow the 
development of new medicines, stifle academic research, and discourage 
investment in downstream R&D.”126  The United States has patented one-
fifth of human genes, according to one study.127  This has prompted gene 
patent opponents, including Congressman Becerra, to claim that one-fifth 
of your genome is “owned” by someone else.128  Unfortunately, such 
                                                 
121 See generally Jacqueline A. Paine et al., Improving the Nutritional Value of Golden 
Rice Through Increased Pro-Vitamin A Content, 23 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 482 
(2005) (describing the preferential accumulation of beta-carotene in rice through the 
transgenic expression of the phytoene synthase gene from maize in combination with the 
Erwinia uredovora carotene desaturase gene). 
122 See Stanley P. Kowalski & R. David Kryder, Golden Rice: A Case Study in 
Intellectual Property Management and International Capacity Building, 13 RISK 47, 51-
52 (2002). 
123 See Ronald P. Cantrell et al., The Impact of Intellectual Property on Nonprofit 
Research Institutions and the Developing Countries They Serve, 6 MINN. J. L. SCI. & 
TECH. 253, 269 (2004). 
124 Id. at 270; see Remigius N. Nwabueze, What Can Genomics and Health 
Biotechnology Do For Developing Countries?, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 369, 394 
(2005). 
125 See Gregory C. Ellis, Intellectual Property Rights and the Public Sector: Why 
Compulsory Licensing of Protected Technologies Critical for Food Security Might Just 
Work in China, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 699, 708 (2007) (raising concerns that China’s 
public sector agricultural biotechnology industry might be disadvantaged because of 
foreign competition resulting from China’s strengthening intellectual property laws). 
126 Kyle Jensen & Fiona Murray, Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human Genome, 
310 SCI. 239, 239 (2005). 
127 Id. 
128 153 CONG. REC. E315 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2007) (statement of Rep. Becerra), 2007 WL 
433061; see also Crichton, supra note 15, at A23.  
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estimates are significantly overstated.129  Because human gene patents 
may include a variety of functional uses from simple gene fusions to 
complex hybridization arrays, it is improper to assume each patent 
claiming a human genetic composition confers ownership to that 
respective human gene.130  In fact, the abovementioned study showed that 
some genes have as many as twenty patents attributed to that one gene’s 
sequence.131  Anxieties of having “one-fifth” of your genome “owned” are 
further undermined by the fact that there have only been six lawsuits 
alleging infringement of a human gene patent as identified in the 
aforementioned study.132 
 
[36]  Apart from the fact that many human genes comprise sequences that 
the United States claims through patents, there is limited empirical 
evidence that gene patents adversely affect innovation.133  For example, a 
recent empirical study ultimately challenges the “the widely held belief 
that the rapid growth in biotechnology patenting over the last decade is 
impeding innovation.”134  The study argues that simply counting patents 
leads to false predictions and unrealistic expectations.135  Instead, the 
authors examined “investigations of broad patent trends, patterns of patent 
ownership, and the distribution of patents across PTO patent 
subclasses.”136  The results showed a continuous entry of new patent 
owners, that biotechnology patents were diffuse among owners, and 
biotechnology patent applications were rising.137  As a result, the authors 
concluded that “overall biotechnology innovation is not being impaired by 
the growth in patents issued each year.”138  For now, while the thicket of 
gene patents may be increasing, the resulting anticommons has not yet 
become tragic.  Moreover, concerns of slowed innovation because of 
patent thickets are not exclusive to gene patents as there are also 
                                                 
129 See Holman, supra note 30, at 299.  
130 See id. at 315-16.  
131 Jensen & Murray, supra note 126, at 239. 
132 Holman, supra note 30, at 353.  
133 See Caulfield, supra note 24, at 1093-94.  
134 Adelman & DeAngelis, supra note 80, at 1679. 
135 Id., at 1679-80. 
136 Id., at 1681. 
137 Id., at 1729. 
138 Id. 
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predictions that there will be slowed innovation of semiconductors and 
software.139 
 
C.  GENE PATENTS AND DIAGNOSTIC TESTS 
 
[37]  The increased cost of tests, which could indicate increased 
susceptibility to genetic disorders, is the most widely acknowledged 
negative effect of gene patents. 140  Although there is almost no empirical 
data that genetic tests, or the clinical knowledge resulting from them, are 
negatively affected by gene patents,141 nonetheless, such tests could be 
desirable in order to determine susceptibility to various genetic 
disorders.142  Additionally, genetic tests will have increased use in the 
future as a way to create personalized medicine that will determine which 
drugs will be most efficacious for individual patients.143  The poster child 
example of a gene patent’s supposed detriment to society that has sparked 
intense public debate derives from patents owned by a Utah biotechnology 
company known as Myriad Genetics (“Myriad”).  
 
[38]  Myriad owns patents that relate to methods and materials used to 
isolate and detect a gene known as BRCA1 that confers higher 
susceptibility to breast and ovarian cancer.144  Women who carry a germ-
line mutation of BRCA1 have an approximately 85% risk of developing 
breast cancer and a 60% risk of developing ovarian cancer over the course 
of their lifetime.145  Myriad also holds patents to another breast cancer 
susceptibility gene known as BRCA2.  The patents to these two genes 
have allowed Myriad to develop diagnostic tests to detect cancer-causing 
mutations in the two genes.146  Many opponents of gene patents find it 
egregious that Myriad charges up to $3,000 to test for mutations in these 
                                                 
139 See Yancey & Stewart, supra note 94, at 1226. 
140 See Betti, supra note 12, at 25; cf. Roger D. Klein, Gene Patents and Genetic Testing 
in the United States, 25 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 989, 989 (2007). 
141 See id. 
142 See id. at 990. 
143 See generally Dan Jones, Steps on the Road to Personalized Medicine, 6 NATURE 
REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 770 (2007) (demonstrating how genetic data can be used to 
determine patients’ response to drug therapies).  
144 U.S. Patent No. 6,162,897 (filed May 2, 1997). 
145 See Bernadine Healy, BRCA Genes-Bookmaking, Fortunetelling, and Medical Care, 
336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1448, 1448 (1997). 
146 Betti, supra note 12, at 24. 
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two genes.147  This is about three times as much as other labs could charge 
notwithstanding Myriad’s patents.148  For these reasons, commentators 
have asserted that gene patents “impede access to appropriate health care 
and violate individual rights,”149 or that gene patents “counter[] the goals 
of the healthcare system.”150   
 
[39]  Solutions have been offered to remedy unnecessarily expensive 
diagnostic tests for genetic disorders.  One solution is a limited 
infringement exemption, which was likely modeled after the surgical use 
exemption151 and was included in the previously discussed GRDAA of 
2002 that failed to pass.152  In addition to exemption from infringement for 
noncommercial research, the GRDAA of 2002 would have also exempted 
a health care provider against infringement for noncommercial diagnostic 
testing of genetic disorders.153   
 
[40]  The GRDAA of 2002 is not as ideal as it first appears.  First, some 
commentators have voiced concern that the medical procedure exemption 
has resulted in undeveloped medical procedures.154  Because the GRDAA 
of 2002 was modeled after the medical procedure exemption, similar 
concerns of undeveloped innovation may occur with diagnostic genetic 
tests.  Second, such legislation does not take into consideration 
commercial DNA array technology, which has been pioneered by the 
                                                 
147 W. Nicholson Price II, Patenting Race: The Problems of Ethnic Genetic Testing 
Patents, 8 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 119 (2007); Medical News Today, Myriad 
Genetic Launches Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Breast Cancer Gene Test in 
Northeastern Cities, Sept. 13, 2007, 
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/82147.php. 
148 Price, supra note 147, at 126-27. 
149 Andrews & Paradise, supra note 16, at 404. 
150 Paradise, supra note 81, at 148-49. 
151 See generally Bradley J. Meier, The New Patent Infringement Liability Exception for 
Medical Procedures, 23 J. LEGIS. 265 (1997) (providing an overview of the medical use 
exemption following its recent passage). 
152 See supra Part III.A. 
153 See Betti, supra note 12, at 24. 
154 See generally Emily C. Melvin, Note, An Unacceptable Exception: The Ramifications 
of Physician Immunity from Medical Procedure Patent Infringement Liability, 91 MINN. 
L. REV. 1088 (2007) (arguing that a lack of patent protection for medical procedures will 
result in fewer available medical procedures available to society). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XV, Issue 1 
  
23 
biotechnology company Affymetrix.155  DNA arrays allow the screening 
of hundreds of gene mutations at one time.156  Therefore, instead of asking 
whether an individual has a mutation in gene X, one could theoretically 
screen that person’s entire genome at once for all known mutations.  The 
problem is that separate patent owners, not unlike Myriad, would own 
most of these mutations.  Although the previous section argued that gene 
patents have not created a patent thicket that is significantly hindering 
innovation,157 genome-wide diagnostic DNA arrays could create an 
anticommons effect in the near future.   
 
[41]  If the GRDAA of 2002 had passed, DNA array manufacturers such 
as Affymetrix would still have had difficulty manufacturing their arrays 
because commercial entities would not have been exempted from 
infringement.  The result would have been extremely large transaction 
costs,158 and is likely the reason that Affymetrix is the only notable 
biotechnology company that is actually opposed to gene patents.159  If 
similar legislation were to pass that provided infringement exemptions for 
commercial entities in addition to noncommercial entities with respect to 
genetic diagnostic tests, companies such as Myriad would no longer be 
able to monopolize individual genetic mutations, while companies such as 
Affymetrix would then be able to manufacture genome-wide genetic 
screens.  Thus, an infringement exemption for genetic tests that is 
inclusive towards commercial entities would not leave innovative 
diagnostic arrays undeveloped.  Of equal importance, extending a 
diagnostic testing exemption to commercial entities would curb an 
anticommons effect that might result from genome-wide diagnostic 
testing. 
 
[42]  Another solution offered to remedy unnecessarily expensive 
diagnostic tests involves issuing compulsory licenses of gene patents for 
diagnostic tests, which would force patent holders to license their gene 
                                                 
155 See generally Elizabeth Pennisi, The Ultimate Gene Gizmo: Humanity on A Chip, 302 
SCI. 211, 211 (2003) (describing the science behind gene chip arrays). 
156 Id.; see Betti, supra note 12, at 26. 
157 See supra Part III.B. 
158 Betti, supra note 12, at 26. 
159 Tom Abate, Do Gene Patents Wrap Research in Red Tape?, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 25, 
2002, at E1. 
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patent regardless of the patent holder’s desires.160  Compulsory licenses, 
however, have never been granted in the United States out of fears that 
such licenses will compromise innovation, and are probably only useful in 
limited circumstances.161  In effect, compulsory licenses are not realistic 
options to ensure adequate access to genetic tests. 
 
[43]  Regardless of whether some individuals unfortunately have to pay a 
little more for genetic tests, what many opponents of gene patents seem to 
miss is that the purpose and benefit of gene patents extend far beyond the 
simple development of diagnostic tests.  Gene patent critics have asserted 
that gene discovery does not require the same incentive to innovate as 
drug discovery.162  Yet these assertions confuse the patent policy designed 
to promote incentive to innovate with the incentive to discover genes.  
 
[44]  In reality, most gene patent claims are not methods intended to 
diagnose genetic disorders.163  On the contrary, gene patents have 
                                                 
160 Betti, supra note 12, at 26.  See generally Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts 
Over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the United States and the European Union: An 
Argument For Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1623 (2001) (arguing that broader licensing opportunities and experimental use 
exemptions will alleviate some of the negative effects associated with gene patents). 
161 See generally Ellis, supra note 125, at 708 (arguing that China’s unique public-sector 
driven agricultural biotechnology industry in combination with the properties of such 
technology creates a paradigm in which compulsory licenses may not adversely affect 
innovation). 
162 Andrews, supra note 81, at 77; Andrews & Paradise, supra note 16, at 405. 
163 The exact percentage of gene patents that claim methods for diagnosing human 
mutations is unknown.  Such imprecision is a result of the fact that patents claiming 
methods of genetic testing use claim language that has many meanings and/or purposes.  
For example, some diagnostic test patents use the word “screening” to signify that a 
diagnostic screen is being conducted against a specific human mutation; however, many 
gene patents that have nothing to do with diagnostic tests also use the word “screening.”  
In an attempt to approximate how many gene patents claim diagnostic tests for genetic 
mutations, the author searched the DNA Patent Database for human gene patents from 
the past ten years that claim methods using any of the following words: diagnostic, 
predisposition, screen, screening, detecting, risk, or presence.  While approximately one-
fourth of the human patents found in the database include one of those words, because 
many inventions that are not diagnostic tests also use these words, one-fourth is likely to 
be a gross over-estimation.  In randomly sampling hits (n=50) to determine which hits 
actually claimed methods for testing for genetic mutations, the author determined that 
one-half (n=24) of the hits claim methods for diagnostic tests, bringing the approximation 
between 10 and 15%.  If one considers the fact that roughly one-fifth of all gene patents 
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provided the necessary incentive to innovate many drugs currently on the 
market that simply would not exist without such patents.164  Moreover, 
because many individuals choose not to be tested for genetic disorders out 
of fear of genetic discrimination,165 and further considering the fact that 
the reliability of many genetic tests is questionable,166 one should wonder 
how critical genetic tests really are to public health.  The remainder of this 
article will demonstrate that not only are diagnostic tests a small subset of 
products that arise out of gene patents, but also that therapeutic drugs that 
are arguably more valuable to society depend heavily on the existence of 
such patents. 
 
IV. GENE PATENTS ARE CRITICAL FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY DRUG 
DEVELOPMENT  
 
[45]  Before the criticisms and subsequent counterarguments relating to 
the necessities of gene patenting are addressed, a basic understanding of 
the essential nature of patents as they relate to pharmaceutical drug 
innovation shall be discussed.  This paradigm can then be extended to the 
biotechnology industry.  Similar to small molecule pharmaceutical drug 
discovery, patents containing gene sequences will provide crucial 
incentives for biologic drug discovery. 
                                                                                                                         
have the word “human” in their claims, the total number of gene patents that claim 
methods for human genetic diagnostic testing is likely to be closer to around 2-3%.  
Importantly, it must further be stressed that the patents examined that do claim methods 
for diagnosing human genetic disorders almost always claimed non-diagnostic methods, 
including therapeutic applications.  This fact further substantiates the argument posited 
by this article that gene patents have numerous applications beyond mere diagnostic 
testing for genetic mutations.  While such approximations lack scientific precision, it 
nonetheless demonstrates the notion that diagnostic tests comprise only a fraction of all 
inventions claimed by gene patents.  See DNA Patent Database, 
http://dnapatents.georgetown.edu/search/searchadvdnag.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2008). 
164 See infra Part IV.B. 
165 See generally Paul Steven Miller, Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 26 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 189 (1998) (discussing potential consequences of discrimination 
resulting from disclosure of potential yet undiscovered genetic disorders). 
166 See Michael J. Malinowski, Separating Predictive Genetic Testing from Snake Oil: 
Regulation, Liabilities, and Lost Opportunities, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 23, 37-41 (2000). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XV, Issue 1 
  
26 
A.  THE NECESSITY OF PATENTS IS WELL ESTABLISHED FOR 
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 
 
[46]  Patent law in the United States is enabled by the U.S. Constitution, 
and is intended “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries.”167  The intent of the patent 
system is simple—to encourage innovation.168  Patents encourage 
innovation because the period of exclusivity169 afforded by patents 
provides financial incentive for inventors “to engage in desirable 
behavior.”170  More importantly, this period of exclusivity promotes 
innovation by allowing an inventor to recoup the costs of researching and 
developing a product without any concern that an innovative product will 
be exploited by free riders who did not have to invest in the necessary 
research and development.171  As a result, it is probably fair to say that as 
more investment is required for research and development for any given 
invention, periods of exclusivity become more critical in order to provide 
incentive to innovate.  Patents further benefit the public by encouraging 
disclosure.172  Inventors and the public reach a bargain so that inventors 
receive a private right in the form of a patent in exchange for public 
disclosure of inventions.173 
 
[47]  Patent protection is particularly critical for the incentive to innovate 
pharmaceutical drug therapies.  In the context of this article, 
pharmaceutical drugs are “conventional drugs,” which are small molecule, 
chemically synthesized compounds that are claimed by chemical 
composition patents, not gene patents.174  Exclusive patent rights are more 
                                                 
167 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
168 See ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 9-12 (2d 
ed. 2004). 
169 The period of exclusivity for a U.S. patent is twenty years from the date of filing the 
application.  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000). 
170 SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 168, at 9. 
171 See id. at 9-12; Rowe, supra note 93, at 946-47. 
172 Betti, supra note 12, at 22-23. 
173 All patent applications are published eighteen months after filing.  Thus, inventions 
that are never issued patents are nevertheless still disclosed to the public.  35 U.S.C. § 
122(b); see id.; Hoffman, supra note 99, at 996.   
174 See Tam Q. Dinh, Potential Pathways for Abbreviated Approval of Generic Biologics 
Under Existing Law and Proposed Reforms to the Law, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 77, 90-92 
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critical to the pharmaceutical industry than most other industries because 
research and development costs are extremely expensive and time-
consuming.175  Incredibly, the cost of bringing a single pharmaceutical 
drug to market, which can take up to fifteen years, ranges between $800 
million to $1.7 billion.176  Arguably, a pharmaceutical company will not 
put forth that large of an investment risk without the assurance that those 
costs can be recovered. 
 
[48]  The necessity of patent exclusivity for pharmaceutical drugs has 
been the center of much debate.  Some patent advocates have suggested 
that in light of the fact that a large portion of a drug’s patent term is caught 
up in pre-clinical and clinical trials, “[t]he twenty-year life of a patent 
from the time of application is a very short window within which a 
drugmaker may recoup its research and development costs.”177  In 
contrast, some critics have asserted that patents are unnecessary because 
the large expenditures on marketing demonstrate that pharmaceutical 
companies do not need a period of exclusivity to recover research and 
development costs.178  Arguments such as the latter misconstrue causal 
sufficiency with necessity.  The only reason why the capital exists to 
market the drug is because a patent allowed for the development of the 
drug in the first place.  Without patents, not only would marketing cease, 
but development of new drugs would as well. 
 
[49]  While it may be true that some blockbuster drugs have provided 
handsome profits for the drug companies, such drugs are few and far 
between.  Additionally, the exclusivity term associated with a patent 
further allows for the recovery of the development costs for potential 
drugs that never reach the market.  On average, only one out of every 5000 
                                                                                                                         
(2007) (providing a brief description of traditional drugs in comparison to biologic 
drugs). 
175 See Betti, supra note 12, at 25-26; Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, The 
Benefits and Costs of Strong Patent Protection: A Contribution to the Current Debate, 27 
RES. POL’Y 273, 274-76 (1998). 
176 Sukhatme, supra note 11, at 1218. 
177 Paul T. Nyffeler, Comment, The Safe Harbor of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1): The End of 
Enforceable Biotechnology Patents in Drug Discovery?, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 1025, 1025 
(2007). 
178 See Angell, supra note 12. 
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to 10,000 screened compounds becomes an approved drug.179  Though 
society pays upfront by allowing a pharmaceutical drugmaker exclusive 
control of the drug at first, society ultimately benefits as a result of being 
provided with the innovated product. 
  
B.  BIOLOGICS CURRENTLY ON THE MARKET REQUIRED GENE PATENTS 
 
[50]  Bioethicists have asserted that “while patents on certain products 
related to health care are appropriate—such as patents on drugs—the 
rationales for granting such patents do not apply to patents on genes.”180  
These opponents will further proclaim that “[t]he discovery of genes does 
not require the same commercial incentives as drug development.”181  
These assertions could not be further from the truth, especially considering 
the fact that patents claiming methods for diagnosing human genetic 
disorders comprise only a fraction of the total uses resulting from gene 
patents.182  In actuality, gene patents do require the same commercial 
incentives as drug development because gene patents are required for drug 
development—biologic drug development. 
 
[51]  Biologics, also known as biopharmaceuticals, are essentially drugs 
that are biological products derived from a living organism or cell, or by 
recombinant DNA technology.183  Thus, as opposed to conventional small 
molecule drugs that are a result of chemical composition patents, biologics 
are drugs that are usually protected by gene patents.  Biologics are also 
drugs that would be negatively affected by the GRAA.  Examples of 
biologics on the market are growth factors, monoclonal antibodies, 
hormones, cytokines, fusion proteins, blood factors, recombinant enzymes, 
recombinant vaccines, anticoagulants, and nucleic acids.184  Biologics are 
                                                 
179 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PHARM. AND MED. MFG., 
available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/cg/cgs009.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2008). 
180 Andrews, supra note 81, at 67. 
181 Andrews & Paradise, supra note 16, at 406. 
182 See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
183 Dinh, supra note 174, at 82.  
184 Aggarwal, supra note 10, at 1097.  
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used to treat a variety of disorders including but not limited to: cancer, 
AIDS, influenza, hepatitis, diabetes, and cardiovascular disease.185 
 
[52]  Sales of biologics are extremely significant for the drug market and 
are not dwarfed by conventional drugs.  In 2006, biologics brought in over 
$30 billion in sales in the United States.186  In 2007, 42% of all products in 
world-wide preclinical testing were protein-based biologics.187  As of 
2001, there were 1,457 biotechnology companies in the United States 
alone.188  Furthermore, biologics are expected to continue to have a 
significant role as drug therapies.189  Biologics experienced an annual 
growth rate of 20% between 2001 and 2006, although during the same 
time period, conventional pharmaceuticals in the United States only 
experienced an annual growth rate of 6-8%.190  Thus, a significant 
proportion of drug therapies that are potentially available to the public 
consist of biologic drug therapies.  
 
[53]  The incentive required to research and develop a biologic drug is no 
less than it would be for a traditional pharmaceutical drug.  In actuality, it 
is more.  Because of the “greater complexity in their manufacture, 
biologics typically cost much more than chemically synthesized, small-
molecule drugs.”191  Similar to conventional drugs, biopharmaceutical 
manufacturers will not even consider investing in the research and 
development required to bring a biologic to market without the guarantee 
that their investing expenditures can be recovered.192  Similarly, as 
opposed to “big-pharma,” many biotechnology companies are start-ups 
requiring venture capital in order to innovate their biologics.  In 2007, 
over $7 billion in venture capital was invested in biotechnology start-
                                                 
185 See Gary Walsh, Biopharmaceutical Benchmarks 2006, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 
769, 775 fig.3 (2006) (providing an update on new arrivals to the biopharmaceutical 
market).  
186 Lawrence, supra note 9, at 1342. 
187 Id. 
188 Klein, supra note 140, at 989.   
189 Dinh, supra note 174, at 78-79. 
190 Aggarwal, supra note 10, at 1097. 
191 Dinh, supra note 174, at 79.  
192 Betti, supra note 12, at 23.  
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ups.193  In order to secure venture capital, bioentrepreneurs absolutely 
must obtain patent protection over their biological product.194    
 
[54]  Biologics are not without unique issues, usually pertaining to 
whether biosimilar generic drugs can be safely manufactured.  Most 
biologics are currently regulated by and require approval under the Public 
Health Service Act (“PHSA”).195  For conventional drugs, the Food and 
Drug Administration (“FDA”) abbreviates approval for generic drugs 
under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”).196  In 
contrast, the PHSA does not expressly provide a mechanism for 
abbreviated approval of a biologic.197  As a result, most biologics 
unfortunately do not have generic counterparts following expiration of the 
respective drug’s patent term.198  Nonetheless, there is much debate as to 
whether the FDA can and should approve generic biologics under the 
FDCA regardless of whether the biologic was originally approved under 
the PHSA.199  Pioneers argue that the FDA should not approve generic 
biologics.200  This is because unlike conventional small molecule drugs, 
“biological sources cannot be accurately characterized or reliably 
produced.”201  Current legislation, however, would provide the FDA with 
express authority to abbreviate approval of a biologic drug.202  This 
complicated debate is important to note.  Because generics do not exist for 
most biologics, many biopharmaceutical drug makers are receiving a de 
facto patent term extension.203  This could result in higher costs to 
                                                 
193 See Stacy Lawrence, 2007—A Banner Year for Biotech, 26 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 
150, 150 (2008). 
194 Betti, supra note 12, at 23; Klein, supra note 140.  
195 Dinh, supra note 174, at 84.  
196 Id. at 77. 
197 Id. at 85. 
198 Cf. id. at 79; William L Warren et al., Abbreviated Approval of Generic Biologics, 26 
GENETIC ENGINEERING & BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS (2006), available at 
http://www.genengnews.com/articles/chitem.aspx?aid=1936. 
199 See generally Carole S. Ben-Maimon & Rob Garnick, Biogenerics at the Crossroads, 
24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 268 (2006) (providing the pros and cons of implementing 
an abbreviated regulatory framework for biologic generics). 
200 Dinh, supra note 174, at 77. 
201 Id.  
202 Warren, supra note 198. 
203 Dinh, supra note 174, at 79; Warren, supra note 198. 
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patients, insurance companies, health plan providers, and taxpayers.204  
Although ultimately outside the scope of this article, legislation that would 
provide a mechanism to bring safe and affordable generic biologics to all 
patients should be vigorously supported and subsequently adopted. 
 
[55]  The impact biologics have on the drug market simply cannot be 
ignored.  Because biologics are industrially more complicated than 
conventional drugs, unique issues persist.  Like all recently introduced 
technologies, the biotechnology industry still requires the fine-tuning 
necessary to provide the most efficient drugs possible.  At any rate, it 
appears as though biologics are steadily becoming more prominent in the 
repertoire of drug therapies available to society.  As a result, such 
technologies should be vigorously pursued and not compromised at the 
expense of a limited number of diagnostic genetic tests. 
 
V.  A BAN ON GENE PATENTS WOULD PREVENT RECENT ADVANCES IN 
BIOTECHNOLOGY FROM MATERIALIZING  
 
[56]  This article has thus far demonstrated the critical role patents play in 
bringing biotechnological innovation to market.  Without patents, 
biotechnology companies would likely rely solely on trade secrets.205  This 
would result in severely reduced instances of innovative advancement for 
all biotechnologies requiring substantial investment costs.206   Opponents 
of gene patents that have failed to appreciate this reality have further failed 
to appreciate that emerging biotechnologies that may benefit society will 
fail to innovate without robust patent protection.  While no one can predict 
exactly what technological innovation the future holds, this section will 
exemplify just two emerging biotechnologies that surely would be harmed 
by passage of the GRAA: RNAi and synthetic biology.  
                                                 
204 Dinh, supra note 174, at 79. 
205 Michael John Gulliford, Much Ado About Gene Patents: The Role of Foreseeability, 
34 SETON HALL L. REV. 711, 730 (2004) (demonstrating the less than optimal options 
biotechnology companies would have without patents). 
206 See id. 
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A.  RNAI 
 
[57]  One biologic drug therapy necessitating gene patents, which is 
expected to reach the market in coming years, centers around the 
technology known as RNA interference (“RNAi”).  RNAi is employed in 
nature by many organisms from fungi to mammals and it functions as a 
natural mechanism to silence gene activity.207  RNAi was first coined by 
Andrew Fire and his colleagues, who discovered that injection of double-
stranded RNA into the nematode C. elegans interfered with the function of 
the endogenous gene corresponding to the specific RNA sequence that 
was injected into the worm.208  This discovery allowed scientists to 
harness this naturally occurring mechanism in order to develop an easy 
and specific method to manipulate gene expression.209   
 
[58]  Being able to manipulate gene expression has tremendous 
therapeutic benefits.  In addition to its research applications, RNAi has a 
potentially therapeutic role benefiting “a wide variety of diseases, 
including malignant, infectious and autoimmune diseases.”210  
Furthermore, RNAi is desirable because it reduces side-effects and 
secondary harm by utilizing naturally occurring mechanisms.211 
One of the current difficulties with RNAi technology is that the progress 
that has been made in understanding siRNA212 in vitro in mammalian cell 
lines has not necessarily translated to in vivo activity.213  The greatest 
                                                 
207 See Scott E. Martin & Natasha J. Caplen, Applications of RNA Interference in 
Mammalian Systems, 8 ANN. REV. GENOMICS HUM. GENETICS 81, 82 (2007) (describing 
the scientific discovery of RNAi). 
208 Fire et al., supra note 2, at 806. 
209 See id. 
210 Li et al., supra note 3. 
211 See Reese McKnight, RNA Interference: A Critical Analysis of the Regulatory and 
Ethical Issues Encountered in the Development of a Novel Therapy, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & 
TECH. 73, 78-80 (2004) (describing the advantages of RNAi over traditional gene 
therapy). 
212 RNAi terminology if often used synonymously with siRNA (small interfering RNAs).  
To distinguish, RNAi refers to the mechanism of silencing gene expression, whereas 
siRNA and miRNA (microRNAs) refer to the physical components of RNA that act as 
the effector molecules to induce gene silencing.  When discussing the potential 
therapeutic application of RNAi with respect to mammalian cells, siRNA is the 
terminology most commonly employed.  But RNAi is the terminology more often used 
when broadly discussing the technology as a whole. 
213 See de Fougerolles et al., supra note 4, at 446. 
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hurdle is currently with drug delivery.214  Nonetheless, there already exists 
“[t]hree different RNAi therapeutics [that] are currently under clinical 
investigation, with several more poised to enter trials soon.”215  The 
earliest clinical applications of RNAi are for respiratory syncytial virus 
(RSV) infection and age-related macular degeneration (AMD).216 
 
[59]  In spite of the uncertainties of RNAi, the technology is rapidly 
advancing.  In 2006, there was a 170% increase over 2005 in RNAi 
patents issued.217  RNAi is further expected to contribute significantly to 
the breadth of biologics available, and new RNAi-focused market entrants 
are joining the biotechnology industry monthly.218  Additionally, Merck 
bought a RNAi-focused company known as Sirna Therapeutics for $1.1 
billion in 2006.219  Patents are undoubtedly fueling the explosion of RNAi 
technology.  Like DNA, RNA is composed of nucleotide sequences.  
Thus, patents claiming compositions or methods associated with RNAi 
would unfortunately be banned if Congressmen Becerra and Weldon’s 
GRAA becomes law. 
  
B.  SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 
 
[60]  Synthetic biology is another emerging biotechnology whose success 
will ultimately depend on the acceptance of gene patents.  Synthetic 
biology is the synthesis of biologically based and complex systems that do 
not display functions that exist in nature.220  Synthetic biology has 
numerous beneficial applications, including the potential production of 
unlimited and inexpensive supplies of medically relevant drugs for 
diseases such as malaria.221  Synthetic biology has environmental 
applications as well, more particularly with respect to biodiesel 
                                                 
214 Id. at 446, 451. 
215 Id. at 451. 
216 Id. at 443, 451. 
217 See Stacy Lawrence, Biotech Patents Still Strong, 25 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1341, 
1341 (2007). 
218 See Randall Osborne, Companies Jostle for Lead in RNAi, Despite Uncertainties, 25 
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1191, 1191 (2007) (discussing the emergence of new RNAi 
focused companies into the biotechnology industry). 
219 Id. 
220 See Kumar & Rai, supra note 7, at 1746. 
221 Id. 
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production, which aims to lessen the environmental impact of producing 
these fuels.222  Because high lipid content is a desirable trait for biodiesel 
production, synthetic genome production could create microorganisms 
with all the necessary lipid production pathway genes in order to regulate 
highly efficient lipid production.223 
 
[61]  Synthetic biology is making rapid advances.  In early 2008, the first 
bacterial genome was successfully synthesized.224  The synthesized 
genome is comprised of 582,970 nucleotide base pairs and was modeled 
after the bacterium Mycoplasma genitalium.225  Like many areas of 
biotechnology, synthetic biology is not without criticism.  Previously 
raised concerns include suggestions that rogue states or terrorist 
organizations might use such technologies for bioterrorism.226  Such 
concerns are completely legitimate and deserve careful scrutiny.  A 
comparison of the advantages of such technology to the possible negative 
effects and questions as to whether synthetic biology deserves to be 
vigorously pursued, however, should be debated elsewhere.  If critics of 
synthetic biology desire leverage to attain their goals, the patent system is 
not the proper forum.  This article has already demonstrated that gene 
patents are unfairly targeted as causes of some of the possible negative 
effects of intellectual property protection, even though most of these 
putatively negative side effects are not even specific to gene patents.227  
The potential advances synthetic biology can make towards public health 
and the environment could be enormous, and must not be sacrificed at the 
expense of far-reaching legislation that is ultimately targeted towards 
problems, which in reality are relatively insignificant. 
                                                 
222 See generally Timothy Searchinger et al., Use of U.S. Croplands for Biofuels 
Increases Greenhouse Gases Through Emissions from Land Use Change, 319 SCI. 1238 
(Feb. 7 2008), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/rapidpdf/1151861v1.pdf 
(demonstrating that current biofuel production may not be as efficient as previously 
acknowledged due to the enormous efforts required to produce the necessary crops that 
will be modified into biofuels). 
223 Biodiesel Times, supra note 8. 
224 Andrew Pollack, Researchers Announce A Step Toward Synthetic Life, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 25, 2008, at A17. 
225 Gibson et al., supra note 6, at 1215. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
[62]  The GRAA sponsored by Congressmen Becerra and Weldon is 
unnecessary and would have ruinous effects on health care and possibly 
even the environment.  Gene patents are not compromising basic research 
and commercial innovation.  While it may be true that development of 
diagnostic tests is inexpensive and probably does not demand the same 
periods of exclusivity that patent policy affords to other technologies, 
diagnostic tests only make up a fraction of the possible uses for gene 
patents.  Most other applications that depend upon gene patents absolutely 
require the patent’s period of exclusivity to ensure innovative incentive. 
 
[63]  This article concedes to some degree that patients are sometimes 
unfairly forced to pay more for genetic tests than could be provided by 
their health care providers.  This article further concedes that issues exist 
with respect to the high costs of brand-name drugs.  Nevertheless, the 
GRAA completely oversteps its bounds in addressing issues relevant to 
gene patents.  A much better solution would be legislation similar to the 
GRDAA of 2002 that provides infringement exemptions for non-
commercial research and diagnostic testing.  Even so, the GRDAA of 
2002 was not perfect, as diagnostic testing is experiencing a paradigm 
shift such that diagnostic tests will likely exist mostly on genome-wide 
arrays in the near future.  When this occurs, commercial entities such as 
Affymetrix, which would not have been exempt from infringement had the 
GRDAA of 2002 passed, might have difficulty maneuvering around the 
individual gene patents protecting respective diagnostic tests.  If the 
GRDAA of 2002 is revived with infringement exemptions for genetic 
diagnostic tests that extend to commercial activities, companies will no 
longer be able to monopolize tests for individual genetic mutations.  
Genome-wide diagnostic array tests, however, would become 
commonplace for genetic testing and would not be left undeveloped.  
More importantly, such legislation would directly address the pertinent 
issues, and would not interfere with the most important and widely used 
application of gene patents—biologic drug innovation. 
